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The United States has invested a great deal of money and effort to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and attack IED networks. However, relatively little research exists that seeks to learn applicable lessons from insurgent"s tremendous offensive success with these crude explosive hazards. This paper aims to identify these offensive lessons learned and explore what methods and resources the U.S. should develop to fully exploit the power of explosive hazards on the Full Spectrum battlefield.
It will accomplish this by reviewing current U.S. landmine policy and existing U.S. landmine capabilities. It will review SPIDER and SCORPION, "networked munitions" that are the new U.S. landmine replacements. Finally, the paper will suggest necessary improvements to these networked munitions and their supporting doctrine with the goal of allowing the U.S. to fully exploit the lessons that IEDs can teach about the relevancy of explosive hazards on the Full Spectrum battlefield.
LEARNING FROM THE ENEMY -OFFENSIVELY, WHAT IEDS SHOULD TEACH THE U.S.
After the Cold War ended, most of the western world basically abandoned land mine warfare. 1 2 Unfortunately however, their enemies did not. Much talent and treasure has been invested by the U.S. to learn how to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and attack IED networks. However, relatively little research exists that seeks to learn applicable lessons from the insurgent"s tremendous offensive success with devices that are little more than homemade mines.
One might dismiss the value of this inquiry by arguing that improvised mines/IEDs are a weaker-force weapon, effectively used only by guerrilla forces conducting asymmetric warfare. One might also posit that IEDs are effective only because the insurgents got lucky and found an exploitable seam in U.S. strengths.
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These arguments are injurious if they prevent us from critically examining the fundamental underpinnings that led to the dominant role that improvised mines/IEDs played in Iraq and are now playing in Afghanistan. In short, the United States would be wise to learn from its enemies.
What we can learn
To win, you must be able to kill.
To date, 2,531 U.S. service members have died in Iraq and Afghanistan due to mines and IEDs and over 23,650 have been injured. 4 Putting these numbers into perspective, over 61% of the total hostile deaths and over 75% of the hostile casualties in these two wars have been caused by improvised mines and IEDs. The effects that these casualties had on the course of these conflicts should not be understated. 5 During the height of the Iraq insurgency in 2007 the casualties inflicted by these 2 devices, more so than any other single fact, were the reason the U.S. military was seen as loosing the fight. 6 In Afghanistan, thought comparatively slow to discover the advantages of IEDs, the Taliban have now turned them into their primary weapon. 7 The simple reason for this is that IEDs work. 8 In the study of war and the admirable desire to turn it into a "science", one can often overlook the simple yet profound fact that, in the end, war is about killing. The base ability to attrit enemy forces -or to kill -remains a fundamental variable that equates to power on the battlefield. In the IED fight, some have posited various ideas in regard to the strategic and operational advantages that insurgents gain from IEDs. 9 These are useful reflections, but it is critical to always remember that these higher order battlefield effects stem from one thing -the enemy"s central ability to kill its adversaries.
Lesson Learned #1: IEDs are an effective means to kill one's enemy.
Better yet, kill without being killed.
During the summer of 2003, in the early days of the Coalition Force operations in Iraq, the various insurgent-terrorist-criminal groups started to coagulate after the chaos of the initial invasion dissipated. Throughout this period they initiated their attempts to attack the Coalition Forces, gain power and apply their will using the weapons they had knowledge of and access to -light machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and small mortars. 10 However, to be effective, small arms attacks required that insurgents engage at relatively close ranges with few forces. At greater ranges their weapons were generally ineffective and if they attempted to mass significant forces to achieve volume of fire, their activities were often prematurely detected. The result of close quarter battle was often the death of the insurgents, particularly after the U.S. fielded uparmored HMMWVs and adequately deployed machine guns on its patrols/convoys.
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To counter overwhelming U.S. firepower, some insurgents cunningly evolved their tactics and employed a weapon that allowed them to avoid a close quarter battleland mines and improvised landmines, which we label IEDs. Insurgents in Iraq did not invent the IED; however they"ve employed it with great effectiveness. 11 Using military grade munitions (primarily artillery shells and mortar rounds) that were widely distributed throughout Iraq, the insurgents had a readily-available base explosive component for their improvised landmines. The next ingredients that completed the devices were either basic direct command operated firing circuits (electric wire and electric blasting caps), or crudely though ingeniously devised remote control firing devices such as washing machine timers or remote car door locking devices connected to a battery and an electric blasting cap.
These early, basic IEDs afforded the enemy sufficient standoff to avoid U.S. direct fire. Standoff also allowed the insurgents to protect their most valuable resource -their anonymity. Anonymity allowed insurgents to live undetected among their enemies, gaining information and choosing the time and place for battle. 12 As U.S.
forces devised countermeasures, the enemy subsequently increased IED sophistication in a cycle of action-reaction-counteraction. Over the next six years, the base explosive expanded to include home-made explosives and improvised or industrially produced shape charges, platter charges and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).
Simultaneously, triggering initiation systems evolved. Victim-operated initiators such as pressure plates, crush wire and passive infrared triggers were employed. Remote control command initiated triggers also became more sophisticated using cordless telephone phone base stations, walkie-talkies, and cell phones. 13 Commanders would greatly covet any way that allowed them to do more with less. Also, given the current unsustainable Federal deficits, cost effective methods that allowed the U.S. to successfully control the ground with fewer expensive Soldiers (remember that a Soldier deployed to Afghanistan costs ~$1M/year) would be readily adopted.
LL -#4. Finally, would the U.S. want to improve its ability to constrain the enemy"s freedom of movement and better shape the battlefield? Indeed. This defensive manual accurately characterizes IEDs as obstacles to maneuver AND as close contact weapons. 35 Thus, while the U.S. has properly understood -in the defensive sense -the effects the enemy is achieving with IEDs, they have failed to fully appreciate -offensively -that their own mines can be both an obstacle and an effective means to close with and destroy the enemy. Among other things, it establishes the principle that non-self-destructing anti-personnel landmines may be used only within perimeter marked areas, protected and monitored to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians; remotely-delivered mines must self-destruct within 30 days at 90% reliability and self-deactivate within 120 days with an overall reliability of 99.9%.
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The other main document, the Ottawa Treaty, has not been signed by the United
States. It was, however, signed by 156 other countries, including all of the other NATO countries, Japan, Australia, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan. 39 This treaty bans the use of all anti-personnel (AP) landmines, making no distinction between persistent AP mines or non-persistent (i.e. those that self-destruct or self-deactivate) AP mines. 40 Rather, the treaty"s prohibitions are based on how the mine is triggered. The Ottawa Treaty defines an AP mine as, "a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons." 41 Having a man-in-the-loop who can confirm that the target is a combatant is the only method to trigger AP mines deemed satisfactory to the international community.  Eliminate all persistent landmines from its arsenal.  Continue to develop non-persistent (self-destructing/self-deactivating) landmines that will not pose a humanitarian threat after use in battle.  Continue to research and develop enhancements to the current self-destructing/selfdeactivating landmine technology in order to develop and preserve military capabilities that address the United States transformational goals.  Seek a worldwide ban on the sale or export of all persistent landmines.  Get rid of its non-detectable mines within one year. 
Current Landmine Options Available to Commanders
Future U.S. mine policy will likely adopt a complete ban on all AP landmines.
Regardless of these possible policy restrictions, there are few options currently available to U.S. field commanders that would allow them to exploit the same advantages that improvised mines/IED have produced for the enemy. With the U.S. no longer using persistent landmines, the only fielded mines available to commanders are scatterable mines that self-destruct/self-deactivate and the one "smart" munition system that has been fielded.
Reviewing these current mine options in more detail, the GATOR mine system is comprised of both anti-tank (AT) and AP mines and is delivered via dispensers on fixed The one "smart" munition that is currently fielded is the M93 Hornet Wide Area
Munition. The Hornet is a hand emplaced, AT munition that uses a top attack smart weapon to engage targets out to 100 meters. 46 To date, however, U.S. forces have not used any of these old systems in the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. 47 48 The self-evident reason for this is that commanders have decided that these old mines do not adequately address their tactical problems.
Simply put, the U.S. has entered into a de facto ban on landmines as none of the current systems are sufficient to aid in the prosecution of the ongoing conflicts.
Many recent discussions have centered on the U.S. military"s hesitancy to restructure and rearm itself to fight its current wars and instead stay stubbornly focused on future major combat operations. 49 Recognizing this issue, the new landmine replacements coming into operation in the near-future should be useful to commanders across the full spectrum of operations.
Near-Future Alternatives
Realistically, it is now problematic to saddle any new device with the moniker of "mine". Regardless of how technologically advanced the device is, calling something a "mine" now carries so many negative connotations that, in all eventuality, no commander would risk the Public Affairs and Information Operations disadvantages of employing it.
Understanding this, the U.S. is now carefully labeling its latest devices as "munitions". It has even gone so far as to rename the venerable Claymore mine as the M18A1
Claymore munition. 50 These are wise decisions as they will make the next generation of munitions more acceptable. However, before these new munitions can be acceptable to the American people, they first need to provide commanders an advantage over the enemy and thus be applicable. This applicability comes from both the capabilities of the new munitions and the soundness of doctrine used to employ them.
Currently the U.S. Army has two new systems, characterized as "networked" munitions, entering the final stages of development or entering low rate initial production. These ground emplaced networked munitions are designed to be recoverable, reusable and scalable and both have lethal and less-than-lethal capabilities. 51 SPIDER is the AP system. In a 2001 National Academy of Science study of alternative technologies to replace AP landmines, SPIDER, then know as the Track I Non Self-Destruct Alternative (NSD-A), was identified as the most promising alternative to the old persistent AP mines. 52 SPIDER notifies an operator manning a Remote Control Station (RCS) when its trip wire sensors have been triggered. The operator then decides whether or not to fire its munitions or take other action. 53 One RCS can control a number (or "network") of individual SPIDERs. This man-in-the-loop manual engagement capability makes it compliant with the Ottawa Treaty as there is no autonomous triggering (also referred to as "target activation") of the modular munitions. 54 SPIDER is designed to serve primarily as a protective obstacle and it allows the U.S. This tremendous demand for systems with observation capability is contrasted with the less than overwhelming demand for systems that don"t, like the current generation of Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS). USG contain only seismic/acoustic sensors and though they were rushed to theater, most languish unused in CONEXs. Doctrinally, all obstacles, both protective and tactical, should be under constant observation. 61 Obstacles should also be covered by direct fire and indirect fire. This is true whether or not the obstacle is explosive (e.g. mines) or physical (e.g. T-wall barriers). For protective obstacles, integration of SPIDER with the Army"s Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance System-Combined (BETSS-C) seems obvious. BETSS-C is an umbrella acquisition program, designed to incorporate numerous platforms to provide surveillance capabilities for force protection at bases and outposts. 62 Similar sensor integration initiatives, such as SCORPION with T-UGS, look obvious as well. It would be ideal, however, if networked munitions had an organic observation capability.
Thankfully, it appears that the Army has acknowledged this as the growth path (Increment II) of SCORPION and SPIDER should possess an optical day and night imager. 63 Doing so, however, will entail necessary trade-offs of increased weight, cost, cube size, detectability and power requirements. A vision of the future
To illustrate how SPIDER and SCORPION might be used in a COIN scenario, the following theoretical vignette is put forward. Note: The capabilities described are ideal objective capabilities, not actual current capabilities.
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A battalion commander in Iraq devised a scheme of operations to secure over 90 km of MSR in his Area of Operations. He had only three companies of combat power, the majority of which were employed protecting the population and training the local security forces. Engineer Route Clearance patrols "cleared" the MSR of IEDs a few times each day, but the battalion lacked the strength to "hold" the cleared roads and nascent Iraqi Security Forces were not yet capable enough to perform the task themselves. The battalion identified three active "IED Hotspots" spread out along the MSR. These IED Hotspots were areas of high IED activity where enemy IED networks had both favorable terrain for IED attacks and a complaisant local population. Four Soldiers were killed in these hotspots in the previous two months.
In addition to other efforts to attack the IED networks, the battalion commander chose to use networked munitions to both directly attack IED emplacers and to deny insurgents the use of advantageous terrain. Two IED Hotspots (now called Targeted Areas of Interest -TAIs) were in rural, open desert. The third TAI was located in the center of a mid-size town.
At the urban TAI, based on the volume of civilian activity and the dense urban nature of the terrain, the battalion commander deemed it a less than ideal location for networked munitions. However, the use of SPIDER and SCORPION at the two rural TAIs allowed him to mass his other Counter-IED assets, such as airborne persistent observation systems, to fully cover this TAI.
At the two rural TAIs, the battalion emplaced 80 SPIDER AP munitions roughly 10 meters off the shoulder of the highway along both sides of the MSR. The battalion also emplaced 20 SCORPION AT munitions interspersed among the SPIDERs. Some SPIDERs were loaded with lethal grenades, others with non-lethal munitions. The nonlethal munitions consisted of a mix of flash-bang grenades, rubber pellet grenades, florescent/IR dye grenades and audible warning modules. The SCORPIONs were set for manual activation.
Once emplaced, the Remote Control Station (RCS) operator, working from a local patrol base a few kilometers away, employed the SPIDER"s trip wire sensors and monitored the sensor feeds. During the next day, a goat herder wandered into the munition field. The tripwire sensors and video feeds alerted the RCS operator who triggered a flashbang grenade followed by the audible warning module, warning the goat herder away. The goat herder went home and warned his family/tribe/village who inquired at the local police station. Trusted local police were previously briefed on the munition field and they explained that its purpose was to protect the local population and that safeguards, like the audible warning, were in place to protect the locals. The police chief asked the locals to leave the devices alone. However, one enterprising local who learned of the munition field was both a part-time criminal and a part-time insurgent. This individual decided that since these new American devices didn"t seem lethal, he might be able to make some money by snatching one and selling it to a local insurgent cell.
Around noon the following day, he stopped his car beside the road, ran out into the munition field, grabbed a SCORPION and ran back to his car with it. In the process of doing so, SPIDER trip wire sensors were triggered, but the RCS operator was unsure about hostile intent and at first only triggered a few flash-bang grenades and audible warning modules. As the RCS operator observed the SCORPION being stolen, based on a previously war-gamed scenario, he chose not to self-destruct the SCORPION or employ its self-protection AP grenades. Instead, he triggered a florescent/IR dye pack in a nearby SPIDER, deactivated the stolen SCORPION and alerted the battle captain. The dye pack grenade marked the thief with indelible florescent ink and infrared dye. The battle captain implemented a set of actions to track signals from tagging, tracking and locating devices attached to each munition, allowing the battalion to track the movement of the stolen SCORPION as it moved from location to location. This intelligence yielded insights into the local insurgent networks and, eventually, to the recovery of the SCORPION munition and capture of the thief/insurgent. The local IED cell learned of the location of this munition field and chose to halt its activity in the area. No IED emplacers were killed by this munition field, but neither were any IEDs emplaced in the TAI. The local IED cell was forced to react to the actions of Coalition Forces. In the end, the networked munition field achieved one of its intended purposes -it denied the enemy access to the TAI, thus "holding" the cleared route.
A few days later, at the second TAI, an old taxi stopped along the highway in the middle of the night and a passenger got out. As he walked along the shoulder, he unknowingly triggered a SPIDER trip wire. Unable to positively identify hostile intent, the RCS operator didn"t fire any munitions, but he alerted the battle captain to the possibility of enemy contact. The battle captain immediately checked the COP for friendly ground forces or aircraft in the area. While observing via the ground-level SPIDER-SCORPION cameras and a secondary, elevated T-UGS camera, the RCS operator witnessed the driver get out of the car, retrieve a shovel from the trunk and take it to the first man who then started to dig. The driver returned to the trunk, pulled out a 155 mm artillery shell, delivered it to the digging man and then returned to the car. Upon seeing the artillery shell, the RCS operator positively identified hostile intent (as per Rules Of Engagement worked out earlier) and triggered the two closest lethal SPIDER munitions, killing the digging insurgent. Simultaneously, he cleared fires of friendly forces with the battle captain, cleared fires of civilian automobile traffic using the seismic, acoustic, radar and optical sensors and triggered the closest SCORPION munition. The SCROPION launched a top attack warhead (necessitating the earlier clearing of airspace) which, once airborne, locked on to the IR signature of the taxi and destroyed it.
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The battle captain then launched a patrol consisting of security, EOD technicians, a Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT) and other intelligence experts to immediately exploit the scene. As the patrol approached the networked munitions field, the RCS operator turned the SPIDERs and SCORPIONs to "SAFE", allowing the exploitation team to safely occupy the scene. The "SAFE" status of the munition field was confirmed on the FBCB2-BFT display in the patrol leader"s vehicle.
This theoretical vignette aimed to illustrate one possible scenario for employing the objective capability of networked munitions in a counterinsurgency fight. Leaders will devise many other Tactics, Techniques and Procedures once they have access to flexible, scalable, modular networked munitions backed up by innovative doctrine.
Where to from here?
IEDs have doubtlessly demonstrated that explosive hazards are an effective means to kill one"s enemy, reduce risk, provide economy of force and constrain enemy movement. A few things have to happen for the U.S. to realize these same battlefield benefits with its new networked munitions.
First, the U.S. should develop and fund an imaging capability (Increment II) for both SCORPION and SPIDER. This will give these networked munitions the target discrimination capability required for the COIN battlefield.
Second, "networked" munitions should be capable of fully integrating with other sensor systems (e.g. T-UGS) and the larger ABCS network. This ability will allow commanders to employ a mix of sensors and munitions that best fit their given tactical situation. The flexibility this integration provides will allow commanders to evolve their tactics, techniques and procedures to meet the threat, in much the same way that IEDs have evolved.
Third, Army and Joint doctrine must recognize that these new networked munitions are both tactical/protective obstacles AND direct-fire close contact weapons.
Finally, the Army must never again downplay the power of explosive hazards on the battlefield. It must remain vigilant against the enemy"s use of even rudimentary explosive devices and it should endeavor to fully exploit the power of explosive hazards for its own ends.
Failure to make the necessary material and doctrinal improvements will lessen the potential usefulness of these new networked munitions on the COIN battlefield.
This will result in the current status quo where insurgents use explosive hazards to great effect while the U.S. and its allies can"t. This amounts to basically a one-sided arms control agreement. As has been demonstrated since the first IED detonated in Afghanistan, we blindly enter into such agreements at our own folly.
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